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BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AT FORTY: WHERE ARE WE?
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Murray Dry'
Forty years after the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,2 Americans
remain unclear about what this famous case stood
for and whether its promise has been or ever will be
achieved. Brown held that "separate but equal is in-
herently unequal in the field of public education."3
While the de jure regimes at first were allowed to
act "with all deliberate speed," the decision did put
an end to racially segregated schools, i.e. de jure seg-
regation. 4 Some constitutional scholars, however,
such as David Strauss, argue that Brown mandated
school integration, or the eradication of de facto seg-
regation, as the only means of achieving equal edu-
cational opportunity.' Strauss claims that the Su-
preme Court backed off from the more ambitious
goal in 1972, when it articulated the "purposeful
discrimination" standard for Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause cases, and thereby produced
a "taming' of Brown."6 The newspaper editorials of
the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, on
the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Brown,
reflect these two different opinions about how the
case should be understood. Shortly before that an-
niversary, in 1991 and 1992, the Supreme Court
decided three important school desegregation cases.
What can we learn by comparing the editorial divi-
sion with the judicial decisions and the different
opinions of the Justices? For one thing, we can learn
how non-expert opinion makers simplify complex
constitutional issues. For another, we can learn how
our understanding of the Brown mandate affects our
assessment of where we stand today in the matter
of implementation. Finally, we can then determine
I Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science,
Middlebury College, Middlebury Vermont. I would like
to thank Paul Dry for reading and comment on my earlier
draft of this paper.
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Id.
4 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
s See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. Law Rev. 935, 1015 (1989).
6 Id. Strauss identifies this approach with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976).
where to go from here. I think the evidence will
show that our current challenges have more to do
with educational quality than school desegregation.
This is because judicial enforcement of the Consti-
tution, with the help of the Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch, as well as state boards of education,
has eliminated, or is in the process of eliminating,
de jure segregation. Further insistence on racial bal-
ance in the public schools, where there is no politi-
cal support for the policy, will not work.
A recent book about Brown provides striking
evidence of the limits of judicial action in matters
concerningAmerican public policy. While most com-
mentators celebrate the Brown decision for burying
Jim Crow, 7 Gerald Rosenberg has argued that "noth-
ing changed in the first decade after Brown." More-
over, "[b]y stiffening resistance and raising fears be-
fore the activist phase of the civil rights movement
was in place, Brown may actually have delayed the
achievement of civil rights."' After demonstrating
the importance of involving Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch in the school desegregation effort,"'
Rosenberg, while conceding that much progress has
been made, suggests that more work needs to be
done, because "it is also incontrovertible that racial
discrimination still exists in the United States."' I This
remark takes us back to the first question. Does sat-
isfying the Brown mandate require the eradication
of racial discrimination in the United States, as both
Rosenberg and Strauss imply? Or is the mandate
limited to ending racially dual school systems, de
jure segregation? Let us begin by looking at the views
of the editorial writers.
7 See Mark Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law:
Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court 1936-1961,
301 (1994) ("From a lawyer's point of view Brown doomed
all Jim Crow legislation'; See also Richard Kluger, Sit1Li.
JusncE, 896 (1975) ("Brown v. Board of Education, for all
of its economy, represented nothing short of a
reconsecration of American ideals").
" See The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change?, 93 (Chicago 1991).
Id. at 120.
,Id.
" Id. at 40 n. 20.
I. TWO DIFFERENT PERSEPECTIVES ON
THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF BROWN
A. The Wall Street Journud May 17, 1994
The Wall Street Journal's (Journa editorial em-
phasizes the greatness of Brown and the infamy of
Plessy v. Ferguson,'2 the decision Brown overturned.
The editorial writer celebrates Brown for having
"commenced the creation of a United States true to
the words of its Declaration that God creates all men
equal was to the Founders 'self evident'.. . . Come
1954, the Court concurred."' 3 Plessy should be
taught, the writer says, in order to appreciate "the
illogic and the parochialism" of "the judicial activ-
ists of 1896."'4 The editorial discusses the absurdity
of apartheid at some length, quoting with approval
dissenting Justice Harlan Sr.'s position on the
"colorblind" Constitution.' s The writer uses Justice
Harlan's position to'criticize current affirmative ac-
tion programs and then to explain how the courts
have gone too far in implementing Brown.16 Rather
than stopping with Brown, "lower court judges were
willing to expand a wide range of claims by over-
leaping legislatures, and... this routine short-cir-
cuiting of any political consensus... lies at the heart
of many current social tensions."'
7
According to the writer, Brown, necessitated by
an inactive Congress, "freed the political system to
respond to claims being made by ... the civil rights
movement."" While "that cause was just," the legis-
lative process is not always swift, and "the great, of-
ten volatile arguments today are between those who
seek social solutions from courts and those who want
these matters exposed to the politics of legislating."9
The writer closes by hailing Brown as "one of the
greatest landmarks in this continuing American ex-
periment."20
Forty years after Brown, the most prominent
American journal of conservative opinion celebrates
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3 Review and Outlook, Wall Street Journal, May 17.
1994, A20. This statement mistakenly equates freedom
with citizenship. For example, the issue in the famous
Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 concerned whether self
government allowed a majority to vote on the issue of
slavery or freedom in the territories. Lincoln, who op-
posed slavery extension on moral grounds, proposed com-
pensated emancipation and colonization until 1864, when
it became apparent that the newly freed race would have
to be given citizenship as well.
'4 Id. This is an interesting description of judicial ac-
tivism, since the Court upheld the Louisiana law requir-
ing "equal but separate" intrastate rail facilities.
's Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554. "The Constitution of the
United States does not, I think, permit any public author-
the controversial desegregation decision. This con-
stitutes a significant shift for the Journal. In 1964, a
columnist described the "warm applause and bitter
criticism" of the decision this way: "The ruling has
been praised as a meaningful advance to American
democracy, as a long step toward lifting, for colored
children, the supposed stigma of inferiority imposed
by separation along racial lines.2  As the stigma was
"supposed," so the civil rights organizations were "so-
called," and they were "demanding more than the
Supreme Court has recognized as their legal due,"2
specifically that lower courts require school boards
"to correct racial unbalance in schools .... To try to
change this situation by busing large numbers of
Negro children into white areas and white chil-
dren into Negro areas is a foolish and mistaken
idea."23 There is no reference to the debate over
the Civil Rights Act or to the question of over-
coming the effects of previously segregated
schools.2 4 Now, the Journal's editorial acknowl-
edges the legitimacy of the Civil Rights move-
ment. But it continues to suggest that all that has
to be done has been done, just as the columnist
did in 1964, prior to the Civil Rights Act's taking
effect and before there was any substantial de-
segregation. The Journal's position is more defen-
sible now than it was in 1964, but its account
fails to acknowledge the difficult and controver-
sial issue of determining when the effects of a
dual, or previously segregated, school system are
overcome.
B. The New York imes May 18, 1994
The New York Times' (Times) editorial calls the'
fortieth anniversary of Brown "an occasion both for
national pride and for national shame. " 5 The writer
praises Brown for having "liberated the nation from
centuries of racial apartheid" but then says "it seems
the national consciousness has changed but the re-
ity to know the race of those entitled to be protected in
the enjoyment of such rights."Id.
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25 Forty Years and Still Struggling, The NewYorkTimes,
May 18, 1994, 25.
ality lags far behind." 6 That is because "an unac-
ceptable number of minority students still attend
al-minority or nearly all-minority schools. 27 In place
of legally sanctioned segregation, "suburbanization,
white flight, industrial decay and political ennui"
combine "to keep minority students in poorer dis-
tricts, in schools with lower expectations for their
students' achievement, in communities that are
nurseries for failure."2" The writer then describes the
Supreme Court's claim, in Plessy, that enforced seg-
regation had nothing to do with stamping one race
as inferior as "bogus sociology" that had to be re-
jected before 'America could ... move forward.""q
This was a covert rejoinder to the criticism that fol-
lowed the Brown Court's reliance on Kenneth Clark's
sociological study of children's doll preferences to
show the harmful effects of segregation. 0
Efforts at implementation, the writer continues,
are met with resistance in the South and more subtle
non-compliance in the North.3' Whites fled the cit-
ies so their children did not have to go to school
with blacks, thus producing the imbalance in the
city school district.32 After referring to the gains at-
tained by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the writer
describes the anniversary's "blend of satisfaction and
frustration" by referring to the lawsuits challenging
inequities in funding of school districts by property
taxes and district lines, which allow residential seg-
regation.3 The final paragraph refers to the Brown
decision as revolutionary and warns that if we do
not live up to its promise in ten more years, "the
price will be high."34 The reader is not told what
these final words mean.
In contrast to the Journal's editorial, the Times'
editorial indicates a keen appreciation of the limits
of mere elimination of de jure school segregation.
To what extent does the Times' editorial think the
overriding challenge is adequate funding for schools,
and to what extent does it suggest that the chal-
lenge continues to be actual racial integration or ra-
cial balance, in the public schools? The editorial
seems to favor cross-district busing plans for metro-
politan areas, even though there is neither political
support nor public funds for such programs. Such
plans are not likely to succeed even if they were








are interested in the education of their children can,
and do, send their children to private schools when
the public schools fail.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION DECISIONS
A. Brown and the Implementation Decisions
The editorial writers' divergent positions on
Brown draw on and reflect, in part, the divergent
positions that Justices of the Supreme Court have
taken in recent school desegregation decisions. The
issues raised in actual cases, however, are not as clear
cut as either editorial writer suggests they are. In
the most recent cases, the Court confronts questions
concerning the test for determining when a school
district has satisfied a judicial desegregation order.
In the first case, the question concerns a district
whose action is challenged as having a "segregative
effect," but which is no longer subject to judicial
enforcement. What is the test for this alleged viola-
tion? 5 In the second case, the question concerns
whether a district can gain partial relief from judi-
cial supervision or whether it must satisfy the su-
pervising court in all respects to gain its autonomy.
36
And the third case concerns the application of the
requirements for eliminating a formerly dual school
system to a state's post secondary school system.37
A brief review of Brown and the Supreme Court's
most important early implementation decisions is
necessary to understand these cases.
The original Brown decision concerned govern-
ment enforced, or de jure, segregation, although part
of the opinion cast doubt upon the adequacy of the
de facto/de jure distinction. The question consid-
ered was, "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race ... deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities?"38 The Court unanimously held that
it does, stating that:
To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race gen-
erates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The
33 Id.
4 Id.
3s Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools
v. Dowell, 111 S.Ct. 630 (1991).
36 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992).
37 United States v. Fordice, 112 S.Ct. 2727 (1992).
31 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
effect of this separation on their educational
opportunities was well stated by a finding in the
Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt
compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
'Segregation of white and colored children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] inte-
grated school system. 9
The Court has "never abolished the de jure/de
facto distinction. This has not always been clear,
however, for two reasons. First, the opinion's em-
phasis on equal educational opportunity4 and its
implicit endorsement of the view that racial separa-
tion is harmful to the minority even without the
sanction of law, allow one to argue that the consti-
tutional mandate must be integrated public schools.
Second, the Court's subsequent consideration and
approval of appropriate remedies for overcoming the
effects of a dual school system resemble a racial bal-
ance requirement. On the other hand, these ap-
proved remedies, which included busing, were al-
ways predicated upon a determination that the
school system was "dual," and that the effects of that
tainted system had to be eliminated. At first this
meant that a freedom of choice plan for individual
students was not a sufficient remedy for a previ-
ously segregated system, because it put too much of
a burden on the individual black families who sought
an integrated education. In Green v. County School
Board,4' decided in 1968, the Supreme Court or-
dered the school board to draw and adhere to com-
31 Id. The opinion is sometimes referred to as Brown
I, to distinguish it from the implementation decision of
1955. In that decision, the Court directed district courts
"to take such proceedings and enter such orders and de-
crees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondis-
criminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to
these cases." Brown, 349 U.S. at 300.
411 A different approach was taken in the companion
case, Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), which in-
volved segregated schools in Washington D.C. and hence
was treated under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. There racial classifications were held to be "sus-
pect," and hence subject to "strict scrutiny."
pact district lines in order to achieve a "racially non-
discriminatory school system."4Z Since there was no
significant residential segregation, however, the or-
der did not require massive busing.43 But the Su-
preme Court did require such busing three years
later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg44 Chief Jus-
tice Burger wrote the unanimous opinion affirming
that "once a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad."45 The opinion also
indicated that once there was full compliance, which
means the system is "unitary," then the racial bal-
ance requirement would not obtain.
46
These two controversial but unanimous Su-
preme Court decisions laid out the constitutional
requirements for school desegregation. When school
desegregation cases arose in northern metropolitan
areas, the Court's decisions ceased to be unanimous,
but its approach remained the same. In Denver,
which had not been a previously dual school sys-
tem, a segregative act was found and as a result sys-
tem wide desegregation orders were upheld.47 In
Detroit, however, a cross-district metropolitan rem-
edy to a finding of segregation in the city's school
system was overturned, because "it must be shown
that racially discriminatory acts of either the state
or local school districts, or of a single school district,
have been a substantial cause of inter-district segre-
gation."48 Then in 1979, the Supreme Court, in two
cases arising in Ohio, extended the full-force of the
"unitary school system" requirement to the North
by asserting that school systems without-laws which
directly required segregated schools were still sub-
ject to judicially ordered remedies on the grounds
that the schools were effectively segregated in
1954.49 And in 1982, the Supreme Court decided
two cases in which the state action was designed to
curb mandatory busing which was aimed at over-
coming the effects of de facto segregation. 0 The de
facto/de jure distinction was once again maintained,
although the Justices disagreed over what consti-
41 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
45 Id. at 15.
46 Id. at 32.
47 Keyes v. School District, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
48 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
4 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449 (1979); See also Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
so Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,458 U.S.
457, 468 (1982); See also Crawford v. Board of Education,
tuted government neutrality towards de facto seg-
regation.51
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of
Brown in the 1990s
The Supreme Court's treatment of school de-
segregation decisions reveals the importance and
complex character of the distinction between gov-
ernment enforced or sponsored racial segregation (de
jure) on the one hand, and the racial segregation, or
imbalance, which results from the different reasons
why people choose to live and hence go to school
where they do on the other hand (de facto).SZ The
first two recent cases involve primary and second-
ary school (K-I 2) systems; in each case, demographic
changes in the school population affected the racial
composition of the schools.
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public
Schools v. Dowell,s 3 decided in 1991, illustrates the
significance of the judiciary's control over remedies
for constitutional violations in matters of school
desegregation. A federal court, exercising its reme-
dial power, can require or prohibit action by a school
board on the basis of the projected effect on the
racial distribution of students in the schools.A school
board that is not under judicial control can act as it
thinks appropriate, subject only to the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause requirement, which pro-
hibits purposeful (de jure) discrimination.-4
Oklahoma City operated a segregated school
system at the time of Broum. s In 1963, the district
court ordered it to dismantle the system.s" There
was no substantial progress until the district court
ordered a system-wide busing scheme in 1972.57 In
1977 the district court ended its jurisdiction, saying
that the Board had operated the Plan properly and
it did not foresee any dismantling of that Plan. s8 Due
to demographic changes that had "led to greater
458 U.S. 527 (1982). In the Seattle case, a state initiative
overturned the school district's integration plan. Wash-
ington, 458 U.S. at 457. In the Los Angeles case, a state
constitutional amendment limited the state courts' power
in school desegregation cases to the federal standard, i.e.
overcoming the effects of de jure segregation. Crawford,
458 US.. at 458. The Court held the Seattle effort un-
constitutional 5-4, while it upheld the Los Angeles ef-
fort 8-1.
s' Four Justices regarded the Seattle action as consti-
tutionally impermissible because the political process was
said to have been restructured in a "non-neutral way."
s1 See Daniel A. Farber, Poverty and Discrimination:
Notes on AmericanApartheid, 11 Constitutional Commen-
tary 455, 461 (Winter 1994-1995).
13 111 S.Ct. at 630.
burdens on young black children" in 1984 the school
board reintroduced a neighborhood school system
for grades K-4, along with a majority to minority
transfer plan. 9 Petitioners, anticipating that the new
plan would lead to less actual integration, filed a
motion to reopen the case. The district court de-
nied the motion.6' The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the 1972 decree remained in force and
imposed "an affirmative duty ... not to take any
action that would impede the process of
disestablishing the dual system and its effects."' 3a The
Supreme Court, in a six-three decision, reversed the
Tenth Circuit.10 Writing for the Court, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist emphasized that "federal supervision
of local school systems was intended as a temporary
measure to remedy past discrimination."' The Court
then remanded the case to the district court to de-
terming whether the school board had acted in good
faith compliance as of 1985. 65 If so, a school board's
subsequent actions, such as introducing the K-4
neighborhood school plan, would be subject only
to the Equal Protection Clause, which protects
against purposeful discrimination.
In an opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, Justice Marshall dissented:
I1] believe a desegregation decree cannot be
lifted so long as conditions likely to inflict the
stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I persist
and there remain feasible methods of eliminat-
ing such conditions .... 66 By focusing heavily
on present and future compliance with the
Equal Protection Clause, the majority's standard
ignores how the stigmatic harm identified in
-Brown I can persist even after the State ceases
actively to enforce segregation .. 67 [Olur
school-desegregation jurisprudence establishes
that the effects of past discrimination remain
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
s DoweU, 111 S.Ct. at 632.
$(" Id.
57 d.
I d. at 633-634.
I, d. Under such a plan, which is common in deseg-
regation efforts, black students may transfer from a school
in which they are in the racial majority to a majority white
school.
"I Id. at 634.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 634-635.
10 Id. at 637.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 638.
66 Id. at 639 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
'7 Id. at 644 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
chargeable to the school district regardless of
its lack of continued enforcement of segrega-
tion, and the remedial decree is required until
those effects have been finally eliminated .. .
[O]ur cases have imposed on school districts an
unconditional duty to eliminate any condition
that perpetuates the message of racial inferior-
ity inherent n the policy of state sponsored seg-
regation... . The racial identification of a
district's schools is such a condition. [In] a dis-
trict with a history of state-sponsored school seg-
regation, racial separation, in my view, remains
inherently unequal.70
As Justice Marshall sees it, as long as there are
any racially identifiable schools in a school system
that was once segregated, judicially enforced maxi-
mum racial balancing should apply. Why? Against
the background of de jure segregation, Justice
Marshall writes, "the persistence of racially identifi-
able schools perpetuates the message of racial infe-
riority associated with segregation. Therefore, such
schools must be eliminated whenever feasible."
7'
Under Justice Marshall's approach, very few school
systems ever found to have been segregated will be
able to gain relief from judicially enforced racial
balancing. Do racially imbalanced schools in the
1990s "perpetuate[] the message of racial inferior-
ity," as long as those schools were segregated in the
past? If, as the district court had found, all vestiges
of the prior de jure system had been eliminated, how
does such a racially imbalanced school system send
a message different from the one sent by any other
racially imbalanced school system in the country?
Perhaps Justice Marshall, who retired from the High
Court on June 27, 1991, would urge the elimina-
tion of those imbalances also. Then the Court would
have broken with the de jure/de facto distinction
and mandated integrated public schools. As we turn
to the 1992 cases, it will be worth keeping Justice
Marshall's perspective in mind, as it helps to ex-
plain the diversity of opinion regarding the Brown
mandate.
& Id.
6 Id. at 648 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
70 Id.
1, DoweU, 111 S.Ct. at 648.
72112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992).
7 Id.
74 Id.
Is Id. at 1436.
76 Id.
Our second case is Freeman v. Pitts.7 2 In it,
the Supreme Court reviewed the desegregation
progress made in the DeKalb County Georgia
School System (DCSS).73 Following the Supreme
Court's Green mandate, in 1969, a federal dis-
trict court ordered DCSS to dismantle all ves-
tiges of its dual school system. 74 The initial plan
called for the elimination of all black schools and
the implementation of a neighborhood school
system.7 s In 1976 DCSS was ordered to expand
its minority to majority student transfer program,
to establish a biracial committee to oversee the
transfer program, and to assign white and black
teachers to schools to obtain a similar racial bal-
ance to that of the student population. 76 In 1986
DCSS went into court seeking a declaration that
it had satisfied the duty to desegregate and was
therefore free of judicial supervision. 77 The dis-
trict court praised DCSS as "an innovative school
system that has traveled the often long road to uni-
tary status almost to its end," and found that the
system was "a unitary system with respect to stu-
dent assignments, transportation, physical facilities,
and extracurricular activities."78 It also found that
"vestiges of a dual system remain in the areas of
teacher and principal assignments, resource alloca-
tion, and quality of education," and thus ordered
DCSS "to take measures to address the remaining
problems."79 The court of appeals reversed on two
points: it held that DCSS had to become a unitary
school system in order to lift judicial supervision;
and it held that student assignments were not yet
"unitary"so
Demographic shifts in the school. district ac-
count for the disagreement on the second point. In
1969, it was relatively easy to integrate DeKalb
County's schools, since there was no substantial resi-
dential segregation; the desegregation decree put a
neighborhood school plan in place."' From 1969 to
1986, however, while the school population re-
mained approximately 70,000, the black student
population went from 5.6% to forty-seven percent.82
The district court found that the racial imbalance




80 Id. at 1437-1438.
8! Id. at 1437.
81 Id. at 1435. Between 1975 and 1980, some 64,000
blacks moved into southern DeKalb County, largely from
Atlanta, and 37,000 whites moved out of southern DeKalb
to surrounding counties.
de jure system.m After noting the steps DCSS had
taken to alleviate the effects of the demographic
changes,84 the district court concluded that "absent
massive busing, which is not considered a viable
option by either [sic] the parties or this court," the
magnet school and transfer programs "are the most
effective ways to deal with the effects on student
attendance of the residential segregation existing in
DeKalb county at this time.""s The court of appeals
held that the racial imbalance was a vestige of the
prior dual school system and that DCSS could have
done more to achieve racial balancing.
86
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion
handed down by Justice Kennedy, held that "federal
courts have the authority to relinquish supervision
and control of school districts in incremental stages,
before fuill compliance has been achieved in every
area of school operations."87 As for student assign-
ments, the Court's position was: "Once the racial
imbalance due to the de jure violation has been rem-
edied, the school district is under no duty to rem-
edy imbalance that is caused by demographic fac-
tors."8
While there were no dissents in this case,"" Jus-
tices Scalia, Souter and Blackmun wrote separate
concurrences, and the opinions highlight differ-
ent concerns. Justice Scalia wrote that "the con-
stitutional right is [to] equal racial access to schools
not access to racially equal schools."' Therefore, he
wanted the burden of proof to rest with the plain-
tiffs to demonstrate an equal protection violation."
For Justice Scalia, the extraordinary remedies that
resistance to Brown necessitated are no longer nec-
essary and hence no longer constitutionally required.
Justice Souter wrote to suggest that the dual school
system might itself be the cause of demographic
shifts and that other Green factors, such as faculty
assignments, might cause student imbalance in the
future.92 Likewise, Justice Blackmun, who only con-
curred in the judgment, and with whom Justices
Stevens and O'Connor concurred, wrote to empha-
8 Id. at 1434.
8 Id. at 1434-1440. These steps included review of
boundary lines and the majority to minority transfer pro-
gram. In addition, magnet school programs were located
in the middle of the county, in order to attract blacks from
the southern and whites from the northern part.
85 Id. at 1440-1441.
6 Id. at 1442.
87 Id. at 1445.
88 Id. at 1447 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32).
8 Justice Thomas, who was recently sworn in, did
not participate in this decision.
0 Freeman, 112 S.Ct. at 1452.
size two points: first, the district court retains juris-
diction while it relinquishes "supervision and con-
trol" over parts of the system; second, on the matter
of racial balance, DCSS "must prove that its own
policies did not contribute" to the demographic
changes. 93
What accounts for this unanimous decision re-
versing the court of appeals and modifying the rules
for judicial supervision of school districts which are
in the process of becoming "unitary"? The decisive
consideration for the Court seems to have been the
good faith effort by the school system, in the face of
the dramatic shift in the racial composition of the
school population, and the resulting residential seg-
regation. Since this demographic change occurred
after a judicially accepted desegregation plan was
implemented, the DeKalb case may be of limited
significance for other school desegregation cases. This
prospect may have pleased some Justices (Souter,
Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor) while it dis-
pleased another (Scalia). Still, the decision may sig-
nal a new stage in the judicial approach to desegre-
gation. In this new era, courts are likely to give more
weight to good faith efforts by school boards, at
desegregation and quality education, than to argu-
ments for continued judicial enforcement of racial
balance, where the existing imbalance is not clearly
connected to a segregative act.
In United States v. Fordice, the Supreme Court
applied its approach to school desegregation to
Mississippi's post-secondary school system. In 1950,
Mississippi had five schools for whites and three for
blacks."' Despite the Brown decision, Mississippi's
post secondary school system remained segregated
by law until James Meredith was admitted, by court
order, to the University of Mississippi in 1962." The
lawsuit that led to this decision was initiated in 1975.
The case went to trial in 1987 after twelve years of
failed negotiations.' 7 The State argued "that the mere
continued existence of racially identifiable univer-
sities was not unlawful given the freedom of stu-
q| Id.
91 Id. at 1454-1455.
13 Id. at 1456, 1457-1460.
"' 112 S.Ct. 2727 (1992).
,s Id. at 2732. The schools for whites were: Univer-
sity of Mississippi, Mississippi State University., Missis-
sippi University for Women, University of Southern Mis-
sissippi, and Delta State University.The schools for blacks
were: Alcorn State University, Jackson State University,
and Mississippi Valley State University. For a further dis-
cussion see also United States v. Fordice, 112 S.Ct. 2727
(1992), 1 REAL Digest 39.
"1 Fordice, 112 S.Ct. at 2732.
.7 Id. at 2733.
dents to choose which institution to attend and the
varying objectives and features of the State's uni-
versities."98 The district court agreed. First, it ruled
that in the higher education context "greater em-
phasis should... be placed on current state higher
education policies and practices in order to insure
that [they] are racially neutral, developed and imple-
mented in good faith, and do not substantially con-
tribute to the continued racial identifiability of in-
dividual institutions."99 It concluded that "the de-
fendants are fulfilling their affirmative obligation to
disestablish the former de jure segregated system of
higher education."100 The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the State's "race neutral policies" give
students "real freedom of choice to attend the col-
lege or university they wish. .. -."0' The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, although not without
some interesting concurring opinions.
Writing for the Court, Justice White denied that
"race neutral policies alone suffice to demonstrate
that the State has completely abandoned its prior
dual system."10Z He identified four policies of the
present university system that were constitutionally
suspect: "admissions standards, program duplication,
institutional mission assignments, and continued
operation of all eight public universities."' 03 The ad-
missions requirements were slightly higher for the
historically all-white schools than for the historically
all-black schools. |04 Given the previous dual school
system and the likely effect of these different stan-
dards, the Court was unanimous in holding this pro-
vision unconstitutional.105
Justice White's discussion of program duplica-
tion, the mission statements, and the continued op-
eration of all eight institutions suggested an approach
to a previous dual school system that might elimi-
nate single race institutions of higher education. This
might happen no matter how much black students
wanted that option. Justice Thomas, who concurred
in the decision, took pains to emphasize that the
98Id.
*" Id. at 2735. The District Court relied on Bazemore
v. Fiday, 478 U.S. 385,407 (1986) (holding that 4-H and
Homemaker Clubs affiliated with states agricultural ser-
vice, which were segregated prior to 1965, and which dis-
continued the policy afterwards, did not have to overcome
any existing racial imbalance, as that was held to be "the




I d. at 2736-2737. Justice White found Bazemore,
upon which the lower courts had relied, inapplicable be-
cause there, unlike here, the District Court had concluded
standard to be used "is far different from the one
adopted to govern the grade-school context in Green
.... In particular, because it does not compel the
elimination of all observed racial imbalance, it por-
tends neither the destruction of historically black
colleges nor the severing of those institutions from
their distinctive histories and traditions."'0 Justice
Thomas's opinion is aimed at demonstrating the le-
gitimacy of institutions of higher education "open
to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established
traditions and programs that might disproportion-
ately appeal to one race or another."0 7 This was in
reply to Justice White's statement that the State may
not publicly finance "exdusively black enclaves" sim-
ply because that is what the private petitioners want.
"It would be ironic, to say the least," Justice Thomas
concludes, "if the institutions that sustained blacks
during segregation were themselves destroyed in an
effirt to combat its vestiges."'08 Justice O'Connor's
brief concurring opinion emphasized the extent to
which the State's history of discrimination in edu-
cation justifies using the Green approach to deseg-
regation in higher education. |°9 She does not dis-
cuss the likely effects on all black educational insti-
tutions."10
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because
of the different admissions requirements, but he dis-
sented otherwise. The Court's approach, he wrote,
resembles the Green approach which "has no proper
application in the context of higher education, pro-
vides no genuine guidance to States and lower courts,
and is as likely to subvert as to promote the inter-
ests of those citizens on whose behalf the present
suit was brought.""I Combining schools or making
mission statements uniform will reduce, not increase,
choice, and requiring the State to prove that racially
identifiable schools are not the result of past de jure
segregation "will imperil virtually any practice or
program plaintiffs decide to challenge-just as Green
has-as long as racial imbalance remains.""2 In Jus-
that any existing racial imbalance was the result of "the
wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private indi-
viduals" (citing Bazemore, 106 S.Ct. at 3012).
103 Id. at 2738.
101 Id. at 2738-2739.
05 Id. at 2739.
106 Id. at 2744.
107 Id. at 2746.
108 Id.
'0 Id. at 2743.
110 Id.
M Id. at 2752.
112 Id.
tice Scalia's view, once discriminatory admissions
standards are eliminated, and here the burden is on
the formerly de jure system to demonstrate this, then
the State should be free to govern itself, subject to
the "discriminatory intent and discriminatory cau-
sation test of the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.)13 Furthermore, he thinks the current test




In Broum v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court unanimously outlawed racial segregation in
public schools. While it took over a decade and the
support of the legislative and executive branches of
the federal government, that monumental decision
abolished de jure segregation in this country. But
the opinion spoke about equal educational oppor-
tunity and the effects of separation were described
in such a way as to imply that actual integration
might be necessary to provide that opportunity. The
Court has insisted on two things over the years: that
a finding of de jure segregation must be made; and
that, where it has been made, the burden remains
with the school system to eradicate the effects of
the prior de jure, or dual school system. The Wall
Street Journal's editorial focuses on the limits of the
first point without appreciating the significance of
the second. The New York Times' editorial, on the
other hand, well aware of the extensiveness of the
requirements of disestablishing de jure segregation,
tends to assume that the Brown mandate calls for
actual racial integration, i.e. racial balance
The most recent cases, the three from the 1990s,
reveal the importance of releasing school districts
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2753.
'Is See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971);
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976);
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986)
136 While Justice O'Connor made no reference to all
black schools in her Fordice concurrence, she went out of
from judicial control where they have demonstrated
a good faith effort at overcoming the effects of a
previous de jure system. They also reveal the diffi-
culty of clearly accounting for the causes of current
racial imbalance. That last point is especially impor-
tant in the Fordice case, where the context is post-
secondary education. Not only are there no atten-
dance zones, as attendance is not required, but "ra-
cial imbalance" may, assuming no purposeful dis-
crimination in the present, simply reflect the choices
of some African-Americans to attend predominantly
black institutions. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized the significance of the difference between pri-
mary and secondary schools and post secondary
schools in the context of aid to parochial schools. "
It should be done in this context as well, for the
reasons Justice Thomas gives in his Fordice opinion.
In addition, if the Court can go out of its way to
protect all-women's colleges and universities, even
as it upholds a man's right to attend the nursing
school of his choice, it should do no less for histori-
cally black colleges and universities. "
The Dowell and Pitts cases attest to the Court's
increasing willingness to allow school boards to re-
gain control over their school systems, in whole or
in part, where they have persuaded district courts
that they have made a good faith effort at desegre-
gation. This is sound constitutional law because the
causes of racial imbalance are increasingly distant
from the de jure regimes which Brown held uncon-
stitutional and the presumed benefits of judicially
enforced racial balance are doubtful. Let the focus
be on educational quality and let good faith efforts
at that end be permitted. Otherwise, more and more
children, white and black, will simply flee the pub-
lic school system for private schools.
her way to limit the reach of her court opinion in Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Fordice, 112 S.Ct. at 2743. In that case, the court decided
in favor of a male's challenge to the single sex status of
the nursing school, but Justice O'Connor insisted that the
ruling applied only to the nursing school, not to other
single sex schools and departments.
